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Marx on the Compatibility of Freedom and Necessity:  
A Reply to David James 
 
Jan Kandiyali  
 
Abstract: In a recent paper David James argues for a new understanding of the  
compatibility of freedom and necessity in Marx's idea of a communist society. 
According to James, such compatibility has less to do with anything distinctive 
about the nature of labour and more to do with how communist producers 
organize the sphere of material production. In this paper, I argue that James 
provides a nuanced and plausible account of one part of Marx's story of the 
compatibility of freedom and necessity in communist society but that his account 
misses another, and, in my view, more fundamental part of the story. The part I 
have in mind centres on Marx's claim that communist producers achieve their 
freedom through the performance of necessary labour – by helping others to 
satisfy their needs. I argue that Marx is committed to a stronger claim than James 
wishes to make – namely, that freedom and necessity are not merely compatible, 
but that participation in the realm of necessity is required for human freedom.   
 
It is a distinctive feature of Marx's thought that he does not think that the fact that 
work is a matter of necessity – something that must be done if the human species is 
to reproduce itself – precludes its being free. Indeed, one of the good things about a 
future communist society, on Marx's brief account of it, is that it will create the 
conditions whereby the performance of necessary labour will take on this free 
character.1   
However, two aspects of Marx's views on freedom and necessity have generated 
significant discussion among Marx's commentators. The first concerns the issue of 
the continuity of Marx's thought on these matters.2 All commentators agree that 
Marx, at some point in his life, held the view that freedom and necessity are 
compatible. But was his optimistic belief in compatibility unwavering? According to 
the 'standard story', the early Marx held the view that freedom and necessity are 
compatible, but as he got older and learned more about economics, he instead 
argued that real freedom can only be achieved outside the working day. Strong 
exegetical evidence for this interpretation is often thought to come from a well-
known passage in the third volume of Capital, where Marx describes work as 
inescapably belonging to a 'realm of necessity' and contrasts it with the 'true realm 
of freedom' that exists beyond it (Marx 1998: 807). While this account has generally 
held sway, however, other commentators have argued that Marx remained 
committed to the view that freedom and necessity are compatible in his later years, 
and that there is no change of views on this matter. Key to their argument is a 
reinterpretation of the well-known passage from the third volume of Capital 
mentioned above, according to which while the highest form of freedom can only 
achieved outside the working day, there are still important forms of freedom to be 
had in necessary labour in a communist society. In previous work I have argued for 
an alternative to these two positions (Kandiyali 2014). In my view, we find in Marx's 
writings two models of freedom and necessity, but these two models cannot be 
understood in terms of a shift from the early to the later Marx as the 'standard story' 
suggests. Rather, Marx moves between these two models throughout his writings. It 
is an oscillation rather than a decisive shift.  
The second problem, which has received less concerted attention than the first, 
concerns the manner in which Marx conceives of the compatibility of freedom and 
necessity in a communist society. It is this second problem to which David James has 
recently provided a detailed and philosophically sophisticated response (James 
2017). James' distinctive idea is that it is not anything distinctive about the nature 
of labour that enables freedom to emerge within the realm of necessary, but rather 
the way communist producers organize the sphere material production. As he puts 
it, '[e]ssentially, it is the way in which production is organized by the workers 
themselves, rather than the activity of working taken by itself, that allows some 
room for freedom in the realm of necessity, and thus the possibility of working in 
conditions that are most appropriate to, and worthy of, human nature' (James 2017: 
3).  
In this paper, I argue that James provides a nuanced and plausible account of one 
part of Marx's story of the compatibility of freedom and necessity in communist 
society but that his account misses another, and, in my view, more fundamental part 
of the story. The part I have in mind centres on Marx's claim that communist 
producers achieve their freedom through the performance of socially necessary 
labour – by helping others to satisfy their needs. I argue that Marx is committed to a 
stronger claim than James wishes to make – namely, that freedom and necessity are 
not merely compatible, but that participation in the realm of necessity is required 
for human freedom.   
James on Freedom and Necessity 
Before I discuss James' explanation of the compatibility of freedom and necessity in 
Marx's idea of a communist society, I begin with a brief discussion of how 
commentators before him sought to explain this compatibility. 
According to Sean Sayers, Marx's answer to the question of how freedom and 
necessity are compatible in communist society has to do with the difference 
between animal and human production (Sayers 2011: 65-69). The basic point is that 
animals only produce when their immediate needs compel them to do so, whereas 
human beings produce even in the absence of need. Of course, labour in the realm 
of necessity is directed at needs, and so not fully free. However, it can still be said to 
manifest a degree of freedom in contrast to animal production, in that workers do 
not simply consume whatever is present in their environment to satisfy their own 
needs but work upon an object to satisfy the future needs of others.  
While Sayers' account may provide a plausible explanation for why human activity 
is free in a way that an animal’s is not, however, it does not adequately explain the 
difference between capitalism and communism. For even the most hateful alienated 
labour under capitalism involves working upon an object for future needs, rather 
than immediately consuming it. And yet, Marx would not want to describe such 
labour as anything more than minimally free. Thus Sayers' account fails to capture 
the way that a specifically communist society enables freedom to emerge in 
necessary labour.  
Aiming to rectify this problem in Sayers' account and provide a plausible 
explanation of Marx's view in the third volume of Capital, where he talks of both 
freedom in the 'realm of necessity' and freedom in the 'true realm of freedom', in my 
earlier paper I made a distinction between two different concepts of freedom – both 
of which could be described as variants of positive freedom, and both of which can 
only be achieved in a communist society (Kandiyali 2014: 108-110). The first of 
these freedoms is collective self-determination, and it consists in future individuals 
rationally regulating the sphere of production that satisfies their needs, rather than 
being dominated by the 'blind force' of nature (as in pre-capitalist modes of 
production) or the market (as under capitalism). The second of these freedoms is 
individual self-realization, which consists in the development of essential human 
powers and capacities. My suggestion was that we can explain Marx's position in the 
third volume of Capital in terms of this distinction: while Marx typically holds that 
labour is required for individual self-realization, in the third volume of Capital, by 
contrast, he argues that although labour in the realm of necessity can be a realm of 
collective self-determination, it cannot, for reasons I found unpersuasive, be a realm 
of individual self-realization.  
While James is sympathetic to my distinction between two concepts of freedom, he 
criticizes it for being 'too clear-cut' (James 2017: 3). In particular, 'although 
collective self-determination is indeed a characteristic feature of the realm of 
necessity in communist society, self-realization is, to some extent, also a 
characteristic feature of it' (James 2017: 3). Thus in James' view, it is not 'a matter 
of either collective self-determination or individual self-realization'; rather, 'self-
determination and self-realization...are to varying degrees all present in the realm 
of necessity as it would be in a communist society' (James 2017: 4). As a result, James 
contends that his less rigid account of Marxian freedom 'paves the way for a more 
nuanced view of the differences between freedom in the realm of necessity...and 
freedom in the true realm of freedom' (James 2017: 4).  
To see how it does this, we can begin with James' account of how the realm of 
necessity can be said to be a realm of self-determination – or as he calls it, 
'autonomy' or 'moral freedom' (James 2017: 5). Quoting Rousseau's famous remark 
that 'the impulsion of appetite alone is slavery, whereas obedience to the law one 
has prescribed to oneself is freedom', James argues that Marx can be seen to follow 
Rousseau in thinking that freedom and constraint are only compatible when the 
constraint in question can be said to derive from the willing agent herself. Now in 
the case of labour it might be hard to see how this condition could be met, since here 
the constraint seems to necessarily comes from an external source – namely the 
necessity of having to work to satisfy human needs. However, because a communist 
society is one in which workers 'agree among themselves how the production 
process should be organized and carried out', then although aspects of production 
may remain determined by 'necessity and mundane consideration', there might be 
some room for self-determination in the sphere of production. For instance, 
individuals might collectively decide 'who does what and when, how long each 
person works each day', as well as 'what to produce in what quantity, given the 
existence of certain social needs' (James 2017: 14). Thus in James' view, collectively 
deciding on matters like these 'allows us to speak of constraints to which individuals 
are subject that have their source in these individuals' own wills, even though these 
constraints at the same time have a source which is independent of their wills' 
(James 2017:15).  
If the first step in James' reconstruction of the compatibility of freedom and 
necessity in Marx's idea of a communist society involves the idea that the 
organization of production by the workers allows some room for self-
determination, the second involves the idea this organization can also be said to 
offer some degree of self-realization. The basic idea is that the organization of 
production by the workers involves the exercise and development of certain 
distinctly human powers and capacities, such as the capacity to deliberate and 
engage in acts of self-direction. Thus as James puts it, there is an 'internal relation 
between the exercise and development of distinctly human capacities (self-
realization) and the act of organizing production in association with others (self-
determination), in so far as engaging in this act entails the exercise and development 
of these same capacities' (James 2017:16). Consequently, James argues that his 
account is able to explain how workers are able to achieve some degree of self-
realization through their work – or more precisely, through the the organization of 
their work – even when the activity of their work itself may be relatively 
undemanding and hence an unlikely source of self-realization. 
In this way, James provides a fairly optimistic account of freedom in the realm of 
necessity, in that both self-determination and some degree of self-realization are 
characteristic of it. However, although labour can be a vehicle for the self-
determination and self-realization, it is important to emphasize that, on James' 
account, participation in the realm of necessity is not required for the realization of 
either freedom: other activities can realize them too. In fact, James argues that 
activities outside work offer individuals the greater opportunity for freedom. This 
is because work in modern industrial societies often involves rote tasks that do not 
lend themselves to self-realization, and because though certain aspects of the 
production process may be amenable to deliberation and decision, a large part of it 
remains determined by the requirements of producing for the needs of society 
(James 2017:17-18). Thus if fortuitous personal or productive conditions allow 
individuals not to work and to dedicate themselves entirely to 'genuinely personal 
projects', such as playing music in an amateur orchestra (James' example), then this 
would be a boon for human freedom. I shall return to this claim in the following 
section, for I believe it is at odds with Marx's considered view on the place of work 
in the good or free life.  
I think it is fair to say that the textual evidence for James' view that the organization 
of material production by communist producers, as well as being a form of self-
determination, can also lend itself to a degree of self-realization, is not especially 
strong. Indeed, James himself concedes that these themes are 'largely implicit' in 
Marx, and that some of Marx's remarks on this issue provide support for the more 
rigid separation between self-determination and self-realization he rejects and I 
defend, as for example when Marx says that 'the realm of freedom really begins 
only...beyond the sphere of material production' (Marx 1998: 807). To be fair to 
James, though, the exegetical evidence is often ambiguous and open to his 
interpretation, even if it does not directly confirm it. So to give one example: in 
another passage from the third volume of Capital that James does not quote but is 
congenial to his core claims, Marx writes that although workers under capitalism 
'relate to the social nature of their labour, to its combination with the labour of 
others for a common purpose, as to an alien power...the situation is quite different 
in factories owned by the labourers themselves, as in Rochdale, for instance' (Marx 
1998: 89). This quotation is ambiguous because Marx does not explain why the 
ownership of factories by the workers at Rochdale avoids alienation, but it seems 
plausible that it is partly because their ownership of the factories gives them control 
over production, in a way that offers some degree of self-determination and hence 
self-realization. In any case, even if Marx himself did not explicitly suggest this, it is 
a plausible view and one that is, moreover, entirely in in the spirit of his thought.  
I conclude, then, that James is right to argue that my earlier attempt to explain the 
difference between freedom in the 'realm of necessity' and freedom in the 'true 
realm of freedom', by making a distinction between two different kinds of freedom, 
relies on a distinction that is ultimately 'too clear-cut', even though some of Marx's 
remarks invite such an interpretation; and that James' account provides a more 
nuanced account of this part of the story of the compatibility of freedom and 
necessity in communist society. In the next section, however, I argue that James' 
own explanation of the compatibility of freedom and necessity in a communist 
society misses a more fundamental aspect of the Marxian story.  
Self-Realization Through Labour 
To make this claim, I begin by quoting the concluding passage of the early Marx's 
'Comments on James Mill'. There, Marx invites the reader to imagine that we had 
‘produced as human beings’, which is to say, in a non-alienated fashion under 
communism. In that case: 
'1) In my production I would have objectified my individuality, its specific 
character, and therefore enjoyed not only an individual manifestation of 
my life during the activity, but also when looking at the object I would 
have the individual pleasure of knowing my personality to be objective, 
visible to the senses and hence a power beyond all doubt. 2) In your 
enjoyment or use of my product I would have the direct enjoyment both 
of being conscious of having satisfied a human need by my work, that is, 
of having objectified man’s essential nature [Wesen], and of having thus 
created an object corresponding to the needs of another man’s essential 
nature. 3) I would have been for you the mediator [der mittler] between 
you and the species, and therefore would become recognised and felt by 
you yourself as a completion [Ergänzung] of your own essential nature 
and as a necessary part of yourself, and consequently would know myself 
to be confirmed both in your thought and your love. 4) In the individual 
expression of my life I would have directly created your expression of 
your life, and therefore in my individual activity I would have directly 
confirmed and realised my true nature, my human nature, my communal 
nature [mein wahres Wesen, mein menschliches, mein Gemeinwesen] 
(Marx 1975a: 277–288). 
This is a complex passage, which I can only briefly summarize here.3 The key point 
is that Marx is describing a communist society as one in which individuals achieve 
self-realization through labour – by helping others to satisfy their needs. Thus in (1) 
Marx claims that in non-alienated production I would enjoy an individual expression 
of life during production and in knowing my personality to be manifest in the 
product I create. However, in (2) through to (4) Marx emphasizes how my 
production serves another, satisfies their need, and how that production for others 
contributes to my own, as well as the others, self-realization. Thus when you 
consume my product, I experience the enjoyment of knowing that my activity has 
satisfied your need. Because I have satisfied your need, you recognize me as the 
'completion' of your essential nature. And finally, because I recognize that you 
appreciate my production for you, my cognizance of your appreciation completes 
my self-realization.  
What I want to emphasize is that this account of self-realization through labour that 
meets the needs of others, labour that characterizes production in a communist 
society, involves a distinctive conception of the relationship between freedom and 
necessity.4 According to this conception, freedom is not merely compatible with 
necessity. Rather, the necessity of labour is part of the explanation for why labour is 
a free and self-realizing activity. For it is only in labour that 'I would have the direct 
enjoyment both of being conscious of having satisfied a human need', and it is only 
when I have satisfied another's need that I can be recognized as completing 
another's 'essential nature'. Of course, one could enjoy 'genuinely personal projects' 
that are not directed at meeting needs. But, for reasons given, the type of self-
realization that Marx identifies here can only be had in the realm of necessity.  
To see the distinctiveness of Marx's view on this matter, we may ask the following 
question, which James also considers in his paper – namely, what would Marx think 
of a society where needs are met without people having to work, so that people may 
devote themselves to whatever they find intrinsically enjoyable? A description of 
the kind of society I have in mind is provided – and endorsed – by Hume: 
'Let us suppose that nature has bestowed on the human race such a 
profuse abundance of all external conveniences, that, without any 
uncertainty in the event, without any care or industry on our part, every 
individual finds himself fully provided with whatever his most voracious 
appetites can want, or luxurious imagination wish or desire...No 
laborious occupation required; no tillage, no navigation. Music, poetry, 
and contemplation form his sole business: conversation, mirth and 
friendship his sole amusement' (Hume 1994: 80). 
Now, I think that Marx, in contrast to Hume, would not see such a situation as an 
ideal. For in Marx's view, people realize their nature by engaging their powers and 
capacities in the satisfaction of another's needs. Thus people could not flourish if 
God were to rain manna from heaven, because that would make producing for 
others superfluous. In conditions of superabundance, people would not enjoy the 
knowledge that they had satisfied another's essential needs, or the recognition of 
others for completing their essential nature. Thus their self-realization would be 
incomplete. Now this does not commit Marx to the implausible view that 'the more 
labour the better', for even if labour is required for self-realization it does not follow 
that the more we work, the more we flourish. What human beings need, Marx 
thought, is 'a totality of human manifestations of life', that is, both labour and leisure 
(Marx 1975b: 304). Thus if productive conditions allow people to labour for, say, 
four hours a day and then pursue personal projects in the remaining time, this would 
be compatible with the requirements of Marxian self-realization, as I interpret it. 
What is not compatible, however, is a situation where people do not need to work 
at all, the situation described by Hume. 
The difference between my interpretation and James' should now be apparent. In 
my view, participation in the realm of necessity is required for the achievement of 
freedom and self-realization. In James' view, by contrast, such participation is not. 
More precisely, in James' view participation is compatible with freedom, because the 
organization of production by communist producers provides some degree of self-
determination and hence self-realization. But it is not required for freedom, because 
other activities can realize these freedoms to a higher degree. Thus people will be 
more free if they are liberated from the constraint of having to produce for others. 
On this issue, James' Marx agrees with Hume.  
Now I think that Marx's considered view is that labour is required for freedom and 
self-realization. Let me provide some exegetical evidence, in addition to the passage 
above, in support of this claim. In the 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts', 
Marx describes labour as  ‘life activity’,  ‘species life’, and as the 'spiritual essence 
[Wesen]', the 'human essence’ (Marx 1975b: 276-277). He also criticizes the political 
economists for mistakenly seeing labour – the 'wealth of human endeavour' – only 
in its relation to 'utility', as ''need'', ''vulgar need'''. In reality, the history of industry 
and the established objective existence of industry are the open book of man's 
essential powers' (Marx 1975b: 302-303). Although these views are especially 
strong in the 1844 writings, they do not disappear in Marx's later work. Thus in the 
Grundrisse, for example, Marx criticizes both the Christian view that labour is a 
punishment for our fallen nature as well as Adam Smith's view that leisure is the 
ideal state of things and identical with 'liberty' and 'happiness'. As he puts it, it '[i]t 
does not seem remotely to occur to him [Smith] that the individual "in his ordinary 
state of health, strength, spirits, skill, dexterity" also needs a normal portion of 
labour' (Marx 1987: 529-530). Likewise, in the first volume of Capital Marx 
questions whether a society of great abundance where needs are met without 
people having to work would be most conducive to self-realization. On those rare 
occasions when the necessities of life are provided gratis, writes Marx, nature ‘keeps 
[man] in hand, like a child in leading-strings...[and] does not impose upon him any 
necessity to develop himself' (Marx 1996: 515). And finally, in the 'Critique of the 
Gotha Programme', Marx famously says that in a future communist society labour 
will become 'not only a means of life, but life's prime want' (Marx 1989: 87). On this 
view, work is not only necessary (a 'means of life), but something that people would 
choose to do above all else ('life's prime want').5 
In reply to quotations such as these, James may concede the textual evidence for my 
interpretation, but argue that his reconstruction offers the more plausible account 
of freedom, and should therefore be adopted on those grounds. In particular, he 
might emphasize how his account does not rely on any controversial perfectionist 
assumptions – for example, about the nature of the human good, or the fulfilling 
nature of specific types of human activity (James 2017:18). However, I would argue 
that these controversial perfectionist assumptions are essential to Marx's position, 
and it is questionable whether an account that jettisons them could really be said to 
capture either the letter or the spirit of Marx's writings. Furthermore, while James' 
interpretation may indeed provide a more palatable version of Marx for 
contemporary political philosophy, with its suspicion of perfectionism, his approach 
also threatens to empty Marx's position of its distinctive content. For consider: 
James' interpretation makes Marx broadly congruent with the dominant view in the 
history of philosophy – here exemplified by Hume – that it is time outside work that 
is most conducive to human freedom and self-realization.6 Finally, though I have no 
time to defend this thesis here, I believe that the view that labour has some special 
significance for freedom and self-realization is more defensible than James 
imagines.7  
 
i  In this paper I use the the terms 'work' and 'labour' interchangeably to 
refer to production directed at meeting human needs. 
i  For discussion of this debate, see Kandiyali 2014. 
i  For an excellent discussion of this passage, see Brudney 1997: 169-192. 
i  Admittedly, Marx does not mention 'freedom' in this passage. However, he 
 
is clearly talking about self-realization, and in various places he makes clear that 
he has a self-realization conception of freedom. For instance, in the Grundrisse he 
describes labour as  'self-realization, objectification of the subject, and thus real 
freedom, whose action is precisely work' (Marx 1987: 530). Likewise, in the 
famous quotation from the third volume of Capital, Marx might also be seen to 
equate freedom and self-realization. There, the 'true realm of freedom' is glossed 
as the 'development of human energy an end in itself' (Marx 1998: 807).  
i  James quotes this passage, but in my view it does not support his position. 
For here Marx suggests that work will become the foremost need in life, whereas 
James describes labour as something that people would reasonably choose not to 
do if the productive conditions allowed it.  
i  In general, I think that James overemphasizes what we might call the 
Rousseauian or Kantian side of Marx's thought (concerning autonomy or self-
determination) and concurrently underplays the Aristotelian side – the side that 
emphasizes that the good or free life is one spent exercising and developing one's 
distinctly human powers. 
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